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Abstract
Optimization of parameterized policies for reinforcement learning (RL) is an impor-
tant and challenging problem in artificial intelligence. Among the most common
approaches are algorithms based on gradient ascent of a score function representing
discounted return. In this paper, we examine the role of these policy gradient and
actor-critic algorithms in partially-observable multiagent environments. We show
several candidate policy update rules and relate them to a foundation of regret
minimization and multiagent learning techniques for the one-shot and tabular cases,
leading to previously unknown convergence guarantees. We apply our method to
model-free multiagent reinforcement learning in adversarial sequential decision
problems (zero-sum imperfect information games), using RL-style function ap-
proximation. We evaluate on commonly used benchmark Poker domains, showing
performance against fixed policies and empirical convergence to approximate Nash
equilibria in self-play with rates similar to or better than a baseline model-free
algorithm for zero-sum games, without any domain-specific state space reductions.
1 Introduction
There has been much success in learning parameterized policies for sequential decision-making
problems. One paradigm driving progress is deep reinforcement learning (Deep RL), which uses
deep learning [52] to train function approximators that represent policies, reward estimates, or both,
to learn directly from experience and rewards [84]. These techniques have learned to play Atari
games beyond human-level [60], Go, chess, and shogi from scratch [82, 81], complex behaviors in
3D environments [59, 96, 37], robotics [27, 73], character animation [67], among others.
When multiple agents learn simultaneously, policy optimization becomes more complex. First, each
agent’s environment is non-stationary and naive approaches can be non-Markovian [58], violating the
requirements of many traditional RL algorithms. Second, the optimization problem is not as clearly
defined as maximizing one’s own expected reward, because each agent’s policy affects the others’
optimization problems. Consequently, game-theoretic formalisms are often used as the basis for
representing interactions and decision-making in multiagent systems [17, 79, 64].
Computer poker is a common multiagent benchmark domain. The presence of partial observability
poses a challenge for traditional RL techniques that exploit the Markov property. Nonetheless, there
has been steady progress in poker AI. Near-optimal solutions for heads-up limit Texas Hold’em were
found with tabular methods using state aggregation, powered by policy iteration algorithms based
on regret minimization [101, 86, 12]. These approaches were founded on a basis of counterfactual
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regret minimization (CFR), which is the root of recent advances in no-limit, such as Libratus [16]
and DeepStack [61]. However, (i) both required Poker-specific domain knowledge, and (ii) neither
were model-free, and hence are unable to learn directly from experience, without look-ahead search
using a perfect model of the environment.
In this paper, we study the problem of multiagent reinforcement learning in adversarial games with
partial observability, with a focus on the model-free case where agents (a) do not have a perfect
description of their environment (and hence cannot do a priori planning), (b) learn purely from
their own experience without explicitly modeling the environment or other players. We show that
actor-critics reduce to a form of regret minimization and propose several policy update rules inspired
by this connection. We then analyze the convergence properties and present experimental results.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we briefly describe the necessary background. While we draw on game-theoretic
formalisms, we choose to align our terminology with the RL literature to emphasize the setting and
motivations. We include clarifications in Appendix A. For details, see [79, 84].
2.1 Reinforcement Learning and Policy Gradient Algorithms
An agent acts by taking actions a ∈ A in states s ∈ S from their policy pi : s→ ∆(A), where ∆(X)
is the set of probability distributions over X , which results in changing the state of the environment
st+1 ∼ T (st, at); the agent then receives an observation o(st, at, st+1) ∈ Ω and reward Rt.1 A sum
of rewards is a return Gt =
∑∞
t′=tRt′ , and aim to find pi
∗ that maximizes expected return Epi[G0].2
Value-based solution methods achieve this by computing estimates of vpi(s) = Epi[Gt | St = s], or
qpi(s, a) = Epi[Gt | St = s,At = a], using temporal difference learning to bootstrap from other esti-
mates, and produce a series of -greedy policies pi(s, a) = /|A|+(1− )I(a = argmaxa′ qpi(s, a′)).
In contrast, policy gradient methods define a score function J(piθ) of some parameterized (and
differentiable) policy piθ with parameters θ, and use gradient ascent directly on J(piθ) to update θ.
There have been several recent successful applications of policy gradient algorithms in complex
domains such as self-play learning in AlphaGo [80], Atari and 3D maze navigation [59], continuous
control problems [76, 54, 21], robotics [27], and autonomous driving [78]. At the core of several
recent state-of-the-art Deep RL algorithms [37, 22] is the advantage actor-critic (A2C) algorithm
defined in [59]. In addition to learning a policy (actor), A2C learns a parameterized critic: an estimate
of vpi(s), which it then uses both to estimate the remaining return after k steps, and as a control
variate (i.e. baseline) that reduces the variance of the return estimates.
2.2 Game Theory, Regret Minimization, and Multiagent Reinforcement Learning
In multiagent RL (MARL), n = |N | = |{1, 2, · · · , n}| agents interact within the same environment.
At each step, each agent i takes an action, and the joint action a leads to a new state st+1 ∼ T (st,at);
each player i receives their own separate observation oi(st,a, st+1) and reward rt,i. Each agent
maximizes their own return Gt,i, or their expected return which depends on the joint policy pi.
Much work in classical MARL focuses on Markov games where the environment is fully observable
and agents take actions simultaneously, which in some cases admit Bellman operators [55, 102, 70, 69].
When the environment is partially observable, policies generally map to values and actions from
agents’ observation histories; even when the problem is cooperative, learning is hard [65].
We focus our attention to the setting of zero-sum games, where
∑
i∈N rt,i = 0. In this case,
polynomial algorithms exist for finding optimal policies in finite tasks for the two-player case. The
guarantees that Nash equilibrium provides are less clear for the (n > 2)-player case, and finding one
is hard [20]. Despite this, regret minimization approaches are known to filter out dominated actions,
and have empirically found good (e.g. competition-winning) strategies in this setting [74, 26, 48].
1Note that in fully-observable settings, o(st, at, st+1) = st+1. In partially observable environments [39, 65],
an observation function O : S ×A → ∆(Ω) is used to sample o(st, at, st+1) ∼ O(st, at).
2 We assume finite episodic tasks of bounded length and leave out the discount factor γ to simplify the
notation, without loss of generality. We use γ(= 0.99)-discounted returns in our experiments.
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The partially observable setting in multiagent reinforcement learning requires a few more key
definitions in order to properly describe the notion of state. A history h ∈ H is a sequence of actions
from all players including the environment taken from the start of an episode. The environment (also
called “nature”) is treated as a player with a fixed policy, such that there is a deterministic mapping
from any h to the actual state of the environment. Define an information state, st = {h ∈ H |
player i’s sequence of observations, oi,t′<t(st′ ,at′ , st′+1), is consistent with h}3. So, st includes
histories leading to st that are indistinguishable to player i; e.g. in Poker, the h ∈ st differ only in the
private cards dealt to opponents. A joint policy pi is a Nash equilibrium if the incentive to deviate
to a best response δi(pi) = maxpi′i Epi′i,pi−i [G0,i]− Epi[G0,i] = 0 for each player i ∈ N , where pi−i
is the set of i′s opponents’ policies. Otherwise, -equilibria are approximate, with  = maxi δi(pi).
Regret minimization algorithms produce iterates whose average policy p¯i reduces an upper bound on ;
convergence is measured using NASHCONV(pi) =
∑
i δi(pi). Nash equilibrium is minimax-optimal
in two-player zero-sum games, so using one minimizes worst-case losses.
There are well-known links between learning, game theory and regret minimization [9]. One method,
counterfactual regret (CFR) minimization [101], has led to significant progress in Poker AI. Let
ηpi(ht) =
∏
t′<t pi(st′ , at′), where ht′ @ ht is a prefix, ht′ ∈ st′ , ht ∈ st, be the reach probability
of h under pi from all policies’ action choices. This can be split into player i’s contribution and their
opponents’ (including nature’s) contribution, ηpi(h) = ηpii (h)η
pi
−i(h). Suppose player i is to play at
s: under perfect recall, player i remembers the sequence of their own states reached, which is the
same for all h ∈ s, since they differ only in private information seen by opponent(s); as a result
∀h, h′ ∈ s, ηpii (h) = ηpii (h′) := ηpii (s). For some history h and action a, we call h a prefix history
h @ ha, where ha is the history h followed by action a; they may also be smaller, so h @ ha @
hab ⇒ h @ hab. Let Z = {z ∈ H | z is terminal} and Z(s, a) = {(h, z) ∈ H × Z | h ∈ s, ha v
z}. CFR defines counterfactual values vci (pi, st, at) =
∑
(h,z)∈Z(st,at) η
pi
−i(h)η
pi
i (z)ui(z), and
vci (pi, st) =
∑
a pi(st, a)v
c
i (pi, st, at), where ui(z) is the return to player i along z, and accumulates
regrets REGi(pi, st, a′) = vci (pi, st, a
′) − vci (pi, st), producing new policies from cumulative regret
using e.g. regret-matching [28] or exponentially-weighted experts [6, 15].
CFR is a policy iteration algorithm that computes the expected values by visiting every possible
trajectory, described in detail in Appendix B. Monte Carlo CFR (MCCFR) samples trajectories using
an exploratory behavior policy, computing unbiased estimates vˆci (pi, st) and R̂EGi(pi, st) corrected by
importance sampling [49]. Therefore, MCCFR is an off-policy Monte Carlo method. In one MCCFR
variant, model-free outcome sampling (MFOS), the behavior policy at opponent states is defined as
pi−i enabling online regret minimization (player i can update their policy independent of pi−i and T ).
There are two main problems with (MC)CFR methods: (i) significant variance is introduced by
sampling (off-policy) since quantities are divided by reach probabilities, (ii) there is no generalization
across states except through expert abstractions and/or forward simulation with a perfect model. We
show that actor-critics address both problems and that they are a form of on-policy MCCFR.
2.3 Most Closely Related Work
There is a rich history of policy gradient approaches in MARL. Early uses of gradient ascent showed
that cyclical learning dynamics could arise, even in zero-sum matrix games [83]. This was partly
addressed by methods that used variable learning rates [13, 11], policy prediction [98], and weighted
updates [1]. The main limitation with these classical works was scalability: there was no direct way
to use function approximation, and empirical analyses focused almost exclusively on one-shot games.
Recent work on policy gradient approaches to MARL addresses scalability by using newer algorithms
such as A3C or TRPO [76]. However, they focus significantly less (if at all) on convergence
guarantees. Naive approaches such as independent reinforcement learning fail to find optimal
stochastic policies [55, 32] and can overfit the training data, failing to generalize during execution [50].
Considerable progress has been achieved for cooperative MARL: learning to communicate [51],
Starcraft unit micromanagement [24], taxi fleet optimization [63], and autonomous driving [78].
There has also been significant progress for mixed cooperative/competitive environments: using a
centralized critic [57], learning to negotiate [18], anticipating/learning opponent responses in social
dilemmas [23, 53], and control in realistic physical environments [3, 7]. In this line of research, the
most common evaluation methodology has been to train centrally (for decentralized execution), either
3In defining st, we drop the reference to acting player i in turn-based games without loss of generality.
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having direct access to the other players’ policy parameters or modeling them explicitly. As a result,
assumptions are made about the form of the other agents’ policies, utilities, or learning mechanisms.
There are also methods that attempt to model the opponents [36, 30, 4]. Our methods do no such
modeling, and can be classified in the “forget” category of the taxonomy proposed in [33]: that is,
due to its on-policy nature, actors and critics adapt to and learn mainly from new/current experience.
We focus on the model-free (and online) setting: other agents’ policies are inaccessible; training
is not separated from execution. Actor-critics were recently studied in this setting for multiagent
games [68], whereas we focus on partially-observable environments; only tabular methods are known
to converge. Fictitious Self-Play computes approximate best responses via RL [31, 32], and can
also be model-free. Regression CFR (RCFR) uses regression to estimate cumulative regrets from
CFR [92]. RCFR is closely related to Advantage Regret Minimization (ARM) [38]. ARM [38] shows
regret estimation methods handle partial observability better than standard RL, but was not evaluated
in multiagent environments. In contrast, we focus primarily on the multiagent setting.
3 Multiagent Actor-Critics: Advantages and Regrets
CFR defines policy update rules from thresholded cumulative counterfactual regret:
TCREGi(K, s, a) = (
∑
k∈{1,··· ,K} REGi(pik, s, a))
+, where k is the number of iterations and
(x)+ = max(0, x). In CFR, regret matching updates a policy to be proportional to TCREGi(K, s, a).
On the other hand, REINFORCE [94] samples trajectories and computes gradients for each state st,
updating θ toward∇θ log(st, at;θ)Gt. A baseline is often subtracted from the return: Gt − vpi(st),
and policy gradients then become actor-critics, training pi and vpi separately. The log appears due to the
fact that action at is sampled from the policy, the value is divided by pi(st, at) to ensure the estimate
is properly estimating the true expectation [84, Section 13.3], and ∇θpi(st, at;θ)/pi(st, at,θ) =
∇θ log pi(st, at;θ). One could instead train qpi-based critics from states and actions. This leads to a
q-based Policy Gradient (QPG) (also known as Mean Actor-Critic [5]):
∇QPGθ (s) =
∑
a
[∇θpi(s, a;θ)]
(
q(s, a;w)−
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b,w)
)
, (1)
an advantage actor-critic algorithm differing from A2C in the (state-action) representation of the crit-
ics [56, 95] and summing over actions similar to the all-action algorithms [85, 71, 19, 5]. Interpreting
api(s, a) = qpi(s, a)−
∑
b pi(s, b)qpi(s, b) as a regret, we can instead minimize a loss defined by an
upper bound on the thresholded cumulative regret:
∑
k(apik(s, a))
+ ≥ (∑k(apik(s, a))+, moving
the policy toward a no-regret region. We call this Regret Policy Gradient (RPG):
∇RPGθ (s) = −
∑
a
∇θ
(
q(s, a;w)−
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
)+
. (2)
The minus sign on the front represents a switch from gradient ascent on the score to descent on the
loss. Another way to implement an adaptation of the regret-matching rule is by weighting the policy
gradient by the thresholded regret, which we call Regret Matching Policy Gradient (RMPG):
∇RMPGθ (s) =
∑
a
[∇θpi(s, a;θ)]
(
q(s, a;w)−
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b,w)
)+
. (3)
In each case, the critic q(st, at;w) is trained in the standard way, using `2 regression loss from
sampled returns. The pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 2 in Appendix C. In Appendix F, we show
that the QPG gradient is proportional to the RPG gradient at s: ∇RPGθ (s) ∝ ∇QPGθ (s).
3.1 Analysis of Learning Dynamics on Normal-Form Games
The first question is whether any of these variants can converge to an equilibrium, even in the
simplest case. So, we now show phase portraits of the learning dynamics on Matching Pennies: a
two-action version of Rock, Paper, Scissors. These analyses are common in multiagent learning as
they allow visual depiction of the policy changes and how different factors affect the (convergence)
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(a) Replicator Dynamics (b) RPG Dynamics (c) Average RPG Dynamics
Figure 1: Learning Dynamics in Matching Pennies: (a) and (b) show the vector field for ∂pi/∂t
including example particle traces, where each point is each player’s probability of their first action;
(c) shows example traces of policies following a discrete approximation to
∫ t
0
∂pi/∂t.
behavior [83, 91, 13, 90, 11, 93, 1, 98, 97, 8, 88]. Convergence is difficult in Matching Pennies as
the only Nash equilibrium pi∗ = ((12 ,
1
2 ), (
1
2 ,
1
2 )) requires learning stochastic policies. We give more
detail and results on different games that cause cyclic learning behavior in Appendix D.
In Figure 1, we see the similarity of the regret dynamics to replicator dynamics [87, 75]. We also
show the average policy dynamics and observe convergence to equilibrium in each game we tried,
which is a known to be guaranteed in two-player zero-sum games using CFR, fictitious play [14], and
continuous replicator dynamics [35]. However, computing the average policy is complex [31, 101]
and potentially worse with function approximation, requiring storing past data in large buffers [32].
3.2 Partially Observable Sequential Games
How do the values vci (pi, st, at) and qpi,i(st, at) differ? The authors of [38] posit that they are
approximately equal when st rarely occurs more than once in a trajectory. First, note that st cannot
be reached more than once in a trajectory from our definition of st, because the observation histories
(of the player to play at st) would be different in each occurrence (i.e. due to perfect recall). So, the
two values are indeed equal in deterministic, single-agent environments. In general, counterfactual
values are conditioned on player i playing to reach st, whereas q-function estimates are conditioned
on having reached st. So, qpi,i(st, at) = Eρ∼pi[Gt,i | St = st, At = at]
=
∑
h,z∈Z(st,at)
Pr(h | st)ηpi(ha, z)ui(z) where ηpi(ha, z) = η
pi(z)
ηpi(h)pi(s, a)
=
∑
h,z∈Z(st,at)
Pr(st | h) Pr(h)
Pr(st)
ηpi(ha, z)ui(z) by Bayes’ rule
=
∑
h,z∈Z(st,at)
Pr(h)
Pr(st)
ηpi(ha, z)ui(z) since h ∈ st, h is unique to st
=
∑
h,z∈Z(st,at)
ηpi(h)∑
h′∈st η
pi(h′)
ηpi(ha, z)ui(z)
=
∑
h,z∈Z(st,at)
ηpii (h)η
pi
−i(h)∑
h′∈st η
pi
i (h
′)ηpi−i(h′)
ηpi(ha, z)ui(z)
=
∑
h,z∈Z(st,at)
ηpii (s)η
pi
−i(h)
ηpii (s)
∑
h′∈st η
pi
−i(h′)
ηpi(ha, z)ui(z) due to def. of st and perfect recall
=
∑
h,z∈Z(st,at)
ηpi−i(h)∑
h′∈st η
pi
−i(h′)
ηpi(ha, z)ui(z) =
1∑
h∈st η
pi
−i(h)
vci (pi, st, at).
The derivation is similar to show that vpi,i(st) = vci (pi, st)/
∑
h∈st η
pi
−i(h). Hence, counterfactual
values and standard value functions are generally not equal, but are scaled by the Bayes normal-
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izing constant B−i(pi, st) =
∑
h∈st η
pi
−i(h). If there is a low probability of reaching st due to the
environment or due to opponents’ policies, these values will differ significantly.
This leads to a new interpretation of actor-critic algorithms in the multiagent partially observable
setting: the advantage values qpi,i(st, at)− vpi,i(st, at) are immediate counterfactual regrets scaled
by 1/B−i(pi, st). This then determines requirements for convergence guarantees in the tabular case.
Note that the standard policy gradient theorem holds: gradients can be estimated from samples. This
follows from the derivation of the policy gradient in the tabular case (see Appendix E). When TD
bootstrapping is not used, the Markov property is not required; having multiple agents and/or partial
observability does not change this. For a proof using REINFORCE (Gt only), see [78, Theorem 1].
The proof trivially follows using Gt,i − vpi,i since vpi,i is trained separately and does not depend on ρ.
Policy gradient algorithms perform gradient ascent on JPG(piθ) = vpiθ (s0), using ∇θJPG(piθ) ∝∑
s µ(s)
∑
a∇θpiθ(s, a)qpi(s, a), where µ is on-policy distribution under pi [84, Section 13.2]. The
actor-critic equivalent is ∇θJAC(piθ) ∝
∑
s µ(s)
∑
a∇θpiθ(s, a)(qpi(s, a) −
∑
b pi(s, b)qpi(s, b)).
Note that the baseline is unnecessary when summing over the actions and ∇θJAC(piθ) =
∇θJPG(piθ) [5]. However, our analysis relies on a projected gradient descent algorithm that does
not assume simplex constraints on the policy: in that case, in general∇θJAC(piθ) 6= ∇θJPG(piθ).
Definition 1. Define policy gradient policy iteration (PGPI) as a process that iteratively runs
θ ← θ + α∇θJPG(piθ), and actor-critic policy iteration (ACPI) similarly using ∇θJAC(piθ).
In two-player zero-sum games, PGPI/ACPI are gradient ascent-descent problems, because each
player is trying to ascend their own score function, and when using tabular policies a solution
exists due to the minimax theorem [79]. Define player i’s external regret over K steps as RKi =
maxpi′i∈Πi
(∑K
k=1 Epi′i [G0,i]− Epik [G0,i]
)
, where Πi is the set of deterministic policies.
Theorem 1. In two-player zero-sum games, when using tabular policies and an `2 projection
P (θ) = argminθ′∈∆(S,A) ‖θ − θ′‖2, where ∆(S,A) = {θ | ∀s ∈ S,
∑
b∈A θs,b = 1} is the space
of tabular simplices, if player i uses learning rates of αs,k = k−
1
2 ηpi
k
i (s)B−i(pi, st) at s on iteration
k, and θks,a > 0 for all k and s, then projected PGPI, θ
k+1
s,· ← P ({θks,a + αs,k ∂∂θks,a J
PG(piθk)}a),
has regret RKi ≤ 1ηmini |Si|
(√
K + (
√
K − 12 )|A|(∆r)2
)
, where Si is the set of player i’s states, ∆r
is the reward range, and ηmini = mins,k η
k
i (s). The same holds for projected ACPI (see appendix).
The proof is given in Appendix E. In the case of sampled trajectories, as long as every state is
reached with positive probability, Monte Carlo estimators of qpi,i will be consistent. Therefore, we
use exploratory policies and decay exploration over time. With a finite number of samples, the
probability that an estimator qˆpi,i(s, a) differs by some quantity away from its mean is determined by
Hoeffding’s inequality and the reach probabilities. We suspect these errors could be accumulated to
derive probabilistic regret bounds similar to the off-policy Monte Carlo case [46].
What happens in the sampling case with a fixed per-state learning rate αs? If player i collects a
batch of data from many sampled episodes and applies them all at once, then the effective learning
rates (expected update rate relative to the other states) is scaled by the probability of reaching s:
ηpii (s)B−i(pi, s), which matches the value in the condition of Theorem 1. This suggests using a
globally decaying learning rate to simulate the remaining k−
1
2 .
The analysis so far has concentrated on establishing guarantees for the optimization problem that
underlies standard formulation of policy gradient and actor-critic algorithms. A better guarantee can
be achieved by using stronger policy improvement (proof and details are found in Appendix E):
Theorem 2. Define a state-local JPG(piθ, s) = vpiθ,i(s), composite gradient { ∂∂θs,a JPG(piθ, s)}s,a,
strong policy gradient policy iteration (SPGPI), and strong actor-critic policy iteration (SACPI) as
in Definition 1 except replacing the gradient components with ∂∂θs,a J
PG(piθ, s). Then, in two-player
zero-sum games, when using tabular policies and projection P (θ) as defined in Theorem 1 with learn-
ing rates αk = k−
1
2 on iteration k, projected SPGPI, θk+1s,· ← P ({θks,a + αk ∂∂θks,a J
PG(piθ, s)}a),
has regret RKi ≤ |Si|
(√
K + (
√
K − 12 )|A|(∆r)2
)
, where Si is the set of player i’s states and ∆r
is the reward range. This also holds for projected SACPI (see appendix).
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4 Empirical Evaluation
We now assess the behavior of the actor-critic algorithms in practice. While the analyses in the
previous section established guarantees for the tabular case, ultimately we want to assess scalability
and generalization potential for larger settings. Our implementation parameterizes critics and policies
using neural networks with two fully-connected layers of 128 units each, and rectified linear unit
activation functions, followed by a linear layer to output a single value q or softmax layer to output pi.
We chose these architectures to remain consistent with previous evaluations [32, 50].
4.1 Domains: Kuhn and Leduc Poker
We evaluate the actor-critic algorithms on two n-player games: Kuhn poker, and Leduc poker.
Kuhn poker is a toy game where each player starts with 2 chips, antes 1 chip to play, and receives
one card face down from a deck of size n+ 1 (one card remains hidden). Players proceed by betting
(raise/call) by adding their remaining chip to the pot, or passing (check/fold) until all players are
either in (contributed as all other players to the pot) or out (folded, passed after a raise). The player
with the highest-ranked card that has not folded wins the pot.
In Leduc poker, players have a limitless number of chips, and the deck has size 2(n+ 1), divided
into two suits of identically-ranked cards. There are two rounds of betting, and after the first round a
single public card is revealed from the deck. Each player antes 1 chip to play, and the bets are limited
to two per round, and number of chips limited to 2 in the first round, and 4 in the second round.
The rewards to each player is the number of chips they had after the game minus before the game. To
remain consistent with other baselines, we use the form of Leduc described in [50] which does not
restrict the action space, adding reward penalties if/when illegal moves are chosen.
4.2 Baseline: Neural Fictitious Self-Play
We compare to one main baseline. Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) is an implementation of
fictitious play, where approximate best responses are used in place of full best response [32]. Two
transition buffers of are used: DRL andDML; the former to train a DQN agent towards a best response
pii to p¯i−i, data in the latter is replaced using reservoir sampling, and trains p¯ii by classification.
4.3 Main Performance Results
Here we show the empirical convergence to approximate Nash equlibria for each algorithm in self-
play, and performance against fixed bots. The standard metric to use for this is NASHCONV(pi)
defined in Section 2.2, which reports the accuracy of the approximation to a Nash equilibrium.
Training Setup. In the domains we tested, we observed that the variance in returns was high and
hence we performed multiple policy evaluation updates (q-update for∇QPG ,∇RPG, and∇RMPG, and
v-update for A2C) followed by policy improvement (policy gradient update). These updates were
done using separate SGD optimizers with their respective learning rates of fixed 0.001 for policy
evaluation, and annealed from a starting learning rate to 0 over 20M steps for policy improvement.
(See Appendix G for exact values). Further, the policy improvement step is applied after Nq policy
evaluation updates. We treatNq and batch size as a hyper parameters and sweep over a few reasonable
values. In order to handle different scales of rewards in the multiple domains, we used the streaming
Z-normalization on the rewards, inspired by its use in Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) [77]. In
addition, the agent’s policy is controlled by a(n inverse) temperature added as part of the softmax
operator. The temperature is annealed from 1 to 0 over 1M steps to ensure adequate state space
coverage. An additional entropy cost hyper-parameter is added as is standard practice with Deep RL
policy gradient methods such as A3C [59, 77]. For NFSP, we used the same values presented in [50].
Convergence to Equilibrium. See Figure 2 for convergence results. Please note that we plot the
NASHCONV for the average policy in the case of NFSP, and the current policy in the case of the policy
gradient algorithms. We see that in 2-player Leduc, the actor-critic variants we tried are similar in
performance; NFSP has faster short-term convergence but long-term the actor critics are comparable.
Each converges significantly faster than A2C. However RMPG seems to plateau.
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Figure 2: Empirical convergence rates for NASHCONV(pi) and performance versus CFR agents.
Performance Against Fixed Bots. We also measure the expected reward against fixed bots, averaged
over player seats. These bots, CFR500, correspond to the average policy after 500 iterations of CFR.
QPG and RPG do well here, scoring higher than A2C and even beating NFSP in the long-term.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss several update rules for actor-critic algorithms in multiagent reinforcement
learning. One key property of this class of algorithms is that they are model-free, leading to a
purely online algorithm, independent of the opponents and environment. We show a connection
between these algorithms and (counterfactual) regret minimization, leading to previously unknown
convergence properties underlying model-free MARL in zero-sum games with imperfect information.
Our experiments show that these actor-critic algorithms converge to approximate Nash equilibria in
commonly-used benchmark Poker domains with rates similar to or better than baseline model-free
algorithms for zero-sum games. However, they may be easier to implement, and do not require storing
a large memory of transitions. Furthermore, the current policy of some variants do significantly better
than the baselines (including the average policy of NFSP) when evaluated against fixed bots. Of the
actor-critic variants, RPG and QPG seem to outperform RMPG in our experiments.
As future work, we would like to formally develop the (probabilistic) guarantees of the sample-based
on-policy Monte Carlo CFR algorithms and/or extend to continuing tasks as in MDPs [41]. We are
also curious about what role the connections between actor-critic methods and CFR could play in
deriving convergence guarantees in model-free MARL for cooperative and/or potential games.
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Martin Schmid, Audru¯nas Gruslys, Neil Burch, Noam
Brown, Kevin Waugh, Rich Sutton, and Thore Graepel for their helpful feedback and support.
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Appendices
A Some Notes on Notation and Terminology
Here we clarify some notational differences between the work on computational game theory and
(multiagent) reinforcement learning.
There are some analogues between approximate dynamic programming and RL to counterfactual
regret minimization in zero-sum games.
CFR is a policy iteration technique: it implements generalized policy iteration: policy evaluation
computes the (counterfactual) values vcpi. Policy “improvement” is implemented by the regret
minimizers at each information state, such as regret-matching which yields the next policy pik+1(s)
by assigning probabilities to each action pik+1(s, a) proportional to its thresholded cumulative
regret TCREGi(k, pi, a). There is one main difference: this improvement step is not (necessarily) a
contraction on any distance to an optimal policy. However, the average policy p¯ik does converges due
to the Folk theorem, so in some sense the policy update operator on pik is improving p¯ik. We give
more detail on CFR in the following subsection (Appendix B).
Like standard value/policy iteration, CFR requires a full state space sweep each iteration. Intead,
Monte Carlo sampling can be applied to get estimated values v˜c [49]. Then the equivalent policy
update operator can be applied and there are probabilistic bounds on convergence to equilibrium.
One main crticial point is that temporal difference bootstrapping from values recursively is not
possible as the Markov property does not hold in general for information states in partially-observable
multiagent environments: the optimal policy pii(s, a) at some state st does generally depend on the
policies at other information states.
POMDPs represent hidden state using belief states. They are different from information states, as
they are paired with an associated distribution over the histories.
The following table shows a mapping between most-used terms that are analogous (mostly equivalent)
but used within the two separate communities:
Computational Game Theory Reinforcement Learning This paper Prev. paper(s)
Player Agent i i
Information set Information state s I
Action (or move) Action a a
History State h h
Utility Reward u,G u
Strategy Policy pi σ
Reach probability 4 η pi
Chance event probability Transition probability T σc
Chance Nature
Imperfect Information Partial Observability
Extensive-form game Multiagent Environment5
Simultaneous-move/Stochastic Game Markov/Stochastic Game
Table 1: A mapping of analogous terms across fields. The last two columns show nomenclature used
for instances of each, compared to the previous papers from computational game theory.
B Counterfactual Regret Minimization
As mentioned above, Counterfactial Regret Minimization (CFR) is a policy iteration technique with a
different policy improvement step. In this section we describe the algorithm using the terminology as
defined in this paper. Again, it is presented in a slightly different way than from previous papers to
4There is no precise equivalent. The closest is the on-policy distribution in episodic tasks µ(s) described in
[84, Section 9.2].
5Also: finite-horizon Dec-POMDP, in the cooperative setting.
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emphasize the elements of policy iteration. For an overview with more background, see [47, Chapter
2]. For a thorough introductory tutorial, including backgound and code exercises see [62].
C Regret-based Policy Gradients: Algorithm Pseudo-Code
The algorithm is similar in form to A2C [59]. The differences are:
1. Gradient descent is used with∇RPGθ instead of gradient ascent in∇QPGθ ,∇RMPGθ , and A2C.
2. An (action,value) q-function critic is used in place of the usual state baseline v.
The pseudo-code is presented in Algorithm 2.
In this paper we focus on episodes of bounded length and tmax is greater than the maximum number
of moves per episode. So there is no TD-style bootstrapping from other values. In environments with
longer episodes, it might be necessary to truncate the sequence lengths as is common in Deep RL.
D Analysis of Regret Dynamics in Matrix Games
In Tables 2, 3, and 4 we show the three games under study, i.e., matching pennies (MP), rock-paper-
scissors (RPS), and a skewed version of the latter, called bias rock-paper-scissors (bRPS) from [10].
In Figures 3, 4 and 5 we illustrate several dynamics in these respective games. More precisely, we
show classical Replicator Dynamics (RD) as a reference point (row a), RPG Dynamics (row b), and
time average RPG Dynamics plots (row c), sorted row by row. As can be observed from the figures,
and as is well known, the RD cycle around the mixed Nash equilibrium (indicated by a yellow dot) in
all three games, see row (a). The RPG dynamics cycle as well, though in a slightly different manner
than RD as can be seen from row (b). Finally, in row (c) we show the average time RPG dynamics.
Interestingly these plots show that in all three cases the learning dynamics converge to the mixed
Nash equilibrium. These final plots illustrate that the average intended behavior of RPG converges
to the mixed Nash equilibrium and that the RPG algorithm is regret-minimizing in these specific
normal-form games [35].
D.1 Normal Form Games Dynamical Systems
Here we present the dynamical systems that describe each policy gradient update rule in two-
player matrix games. For futher detail on the construction and analysis of these dynamical systems,
see [8, 34].
Let us recall the updated we consider in this paper.
QPG:
∇QPGθ (s) =
∑
a
[∇θpi(s, a;θ)]
(
q(s, a;w)−
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b,w)
)
. (4)
RPG:
∇RPGθ (s) = −
∑
a
∇θ
(
q(s, a;w)−
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
)+
. (5)
RMPG:
∇RMPGθ (s) =
∑
a
[∇θpi(s, a;θ)]
(
q(s, a;w)−
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b,w)
)+
. (6)
Let us consider that the game is in normal form and let us suppose that the policy is only parametrized
by logits. The parameter will be θ = (θa)a and pi(a;θ) =
exp(θa)∑
a exp(θa)
in a state less game. It follows
that:
dpi(a;θ)
dθb
= 1a=bpi(a;θ)− pi(a;θ)pi(b;θ) (7)
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Algorithm 1: Vanilla CFR
input : K – number of iterations; pi0 – initial uniform joint policy
1 Initialize table of values vci (pi, s, a) = v
c
i (pi, s) = 0 for all s, a
2 Initialize cumulative regret tables CREG(s, a) = 0 for all s, a
3 Initialize average policy tables S(s, a) = 0 for all s, a
4
5 POLICYEVALTREEWALK(joint policy pi, history h, player reach probs ~η, chance reach ηc):
6 if h is terminal then
7 return utilites (episode returns) ~u = (ui(h)) for i ∈ N
8 else if h is a chance node then
9 return
∑
a∈A(h) Pr(ha|h) · POLICYEVALTREEWALK(ha, i, ~η,Pr(ha|h) · ηc)
10 else
11 Let i be the player to play at h
12 Let s be the information state containing h
13 ~u← ~0
14 for legal actions a ∈ A(h) do
15 η−i ← ηc ·Πj 6=iηj
16 ~η′ ← ~η
17 η′i ← η′i · pii(s, a)
18 ~ua ← POLICYEVALTREEWALK(ha, ~η′, ηc)
19 vci (pi, s, a)← vci (pi, s, a) + ua,i (ith component)
20 S(s, a)← S(s, a) + ηi · pi(s, a) (policy improvement on average policy p¯i)
21 ~u← ~u+ pi(s, a)~ua
22 return ~u
23
24 POLICYEVALUATION(iteration k):
25 Let h be the initial empty history
26 PolicyEvalTreeWalk(pik, h, ~1, ~1)
27 for all s do
28 Let i be the player to play at s
29 vci (pi
k, s) =
∑
b pi
k(s, b)vci (pi
k, s, b)
30
31 REGRETMATCHING(information state s):
32 Define thresholded cumulative TCREG(s, a) = (CREG(s, a))+
33 d←∑b TCREG(s, b)
34 for a ∈ A(s) do
35 pi(s, a)← TCREG(s,a)d if d > 0 otherwise 1|A(s)|
36 return pi(s)
37
38 POLICYUPDATE(iteration k):
39 for all s do
40 Let i be the player to play at s
41 for a ∈ A(s) do
42 CREG(s, a)← CREG(s, a) + (vci (pik, s, a)− vci (pik, s))
43 pik+1(s)← RegretMatching(s)
44
45 for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} do
46 Set all the counterfactual values vci (pi
k, s, a) = vci (pi
k, s) = 0
47 PolicyEvaluation(k)
48 PolicyUpdate(k)
49 for all s do
50 p¯iT (s, a) = S(s,a)∑
b S(s,b)
51 return p¯iT
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Algorithm 2: Generalized Advantage Actor-Critic with (state,action) critics.
input :pi – policy; s0 – initial state
1 repeat
2 Reset gradients: dθ ← 0, and dw← 0.
3 tstart ← t
4 repeat
5 Sample at ∼ pi(· | st,θ)
6 Take action at and receive reward rt and st+1
7 t← t+ 1
8 T ← T + 1
9 until terminal st or t− tstart = tmax
10 G←
{
0 if st is terminal;∑
a∈A pi(a | st,θ)Q(s, a;w) otherwise.
11 for i ∈ {t− 1, . . . , tstart} do
12 G← ri + γG
13 Acc. policy gradients: dθ ← dθ+ δ, where δ is one of {∇QPGθ ,∇RPGθ ,∇RMPGθ } from Sec. 3
14 Acc. q-value function gradients: dw← dw +∇w(G− q(si, ai;w))2
15 Update critic: w← w − αdw
16 Update actor: θ ← θ + αdθ
17 until T > Tmax
p˙i(a;θ) =
∑
b
dpi(a;θ)
dθb
θ˙b = pi(a;θ)(θ˙a −
∑
b
pi(b;θ)θ˙b) (8)
D.1.1 QPG
The dynamical system followed by QPG on a normal form game can be written as follow:
θ˙ =
∑
a
[∇θpi(a;θ)]
(
q(a;w)−
∑
b
pi(b;θ)q(b,w)
)
(9)
θ˙ =
∑
a
∇θpi(a;θ)q(a;w) because
∑
a
pi(a;θ) = 1 (10)
θ˙b =
∑
a
dpi(a;θ)
dθb
q(a;w) = pi(b;θ)
(
q(b;w)−
∑
a
pi(a;θ)q(a;w)
)
= pi(b;θ)A(b,θ,w) (11)
Final dynamical system:
p˙i(a;θ) = pi(a;θ)
(
pi(a;θ)A(a,θ,w)−
∑
b
pi(b;θ)2A(b,θ,w)
)
(12)
where A(a,θ,w) = q(a;w)−
∑
b
pi(b;θ)q(b;w) (13)
D.1.2 RPG
∇RPGθ (s) = −
∑
a
∇θ
(
q(s, a;w)−
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
)+
(14)
∇RPGθ (s) = −
∑
a
∇θ1A(a,θ,w)≥0
(
q(s, a;w)−
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
)
(15)
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∇RPGθ (s) = −
∑
a
1A(a,θ,w)≥0∇θ
(
q(s, a;w)−
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
)
(16)
∇RPGθ (s) =
∑
a
1A(a,θ,w)≥0
∑
b
∇θpi(b;θ)q(b;w) (17)
∇RPGθ (s) =
(∑
a
1A(a,θ,w)≥0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
na+
∑
b
∇θpi(b;θ)q(b;w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∇QPGθ from 10
(18)
∇RPGθ (s) = na+∇QPGθ (19)
it falls that the dynamical system of RPG is:
p˙i(a;θ) = na+
[
pi(a;θ)
(
pi(a;θ)A(a,θ,w)−
∑
b
pi(b;θ)2A(b,θ,w)
)]
(20)
H T
H 1,−1 −1, 1
T −1, 1 1,−1
Table 2: Matching Pennies.
R P S
R 0 −1 1
P 1 0 −1
S −1 1 0
Table 3: Rock-Paper-Scissors.
R P S
R 0 −0.25 0.5
P 0.25 0 −0.05
S −0.5 0.05 0
Table 4: Bias RPS.
D.2 Generalised Rock-Paper-Scissors Game
For the sake of completeness we also looked at the behavior of the dynamics in the generalised
Rock-Paper-Scissors (gRPS) game [72, 45]. More precisely, the gRPS game can be described as
illustrated in Table 5.
R P S
R 1 0 2
P 2 1 0
S 0 2 1
Table 5: Generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors.
We describe the dynamics in this game for replicator dynamics, RPG dynamics, and both replicator
and RPG dynamics as average time dynamics plots. As in the RPS game, the replicator dyanmis and
RPG dynamics cycle around the Nash equilibrium, and the average time replicator dynamics and
average time RPG dynamics converge to the Nash equilibrium, as illustrated in Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9.
A more detailed description on the convergence properties of replicator equations in this game can be
found in [72].
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Figure 3: Matching Pennies
(a) Replicator Dynamics
(b) RPG dynamics
(c) Average RPG dynamics
Figure 4: Rock-Paper-Scissors
(a) Replicator Dynamics
(b) RPG dynamics
(c) Average RPG dynamics
Figure 5: Bias Rock-Paper-Scissors
(a) Replicator Dynamics
(b) RPG dynamics
(c) Average RPG dynamics
Figure 6: Replicator Dynamics in
the gRPS Game
Figure 7: RPG dynamics in the
gRPS Game
Figure 8: Avg. Replicator Dynam-
ics in the gRPS Game
Figure 9: Avg. RPG Dynamics in
the gRPS Game
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E Sequential Partially-Observable Case
Let P be defined as in Theorem 1. We first define the four update rules that we will discuss in this
section. On iteration k, at state s, the update to the policy parameters are:
Projected PGPI : θk+1s,· ← P ({θks,a + αs,k
∂
∂θks,a
JPG(piθk)}a)
Projected ACPI : θk+1s,· ← P ({θks,a + αs,k
∂
∂θks,a
JAC(piθk)}a)
Projected Strong PGPI : θk+1s,· ← P ({θks,a + αk
∂
∂θks,a
JPG(piθk , s)}a)
Projected Strong ACPI : θk+1s,· ← P ({θks,a + αk
∂
∂θks,a
JAC(piθk , s)}a)
Tabular policies are represents in behavioral strategy form: a probability is a weight θs,a per state-
action, where the weights obey simplex constraints: ∀s,∑a θs,a = 1.
In turn-based games, the gradient of a tabular policy,∇θpiθ is then simply a sum of partial derivates
with respect to each specific weight θs,a.
The score function JPG(piθ) = Eρ∼pi[G0 | S0 = s0] =
∑
z∈Z η
pi(z)Gi,z . The contribution of some
θs,a to the gradient is:
∂JPG(piθ)
∂θs,a
=
∂
∂θs,a
∑
z∈Z
ηpi(z)Gi,z
=
∂
∂θs,a
 ∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
ηpi(z)Gi,z
 since other terminal histories do not contain θs,a
=
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
∂
∂θs,a
ηpi(z)Gi,z
=
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
ηpi(h)ηpi(ha, z)Gi,z
:= vη,pi(s, a) (definition)
Here, we define vη,pi(s, a) as the (reach-weighted) portion of the overall expected value contributed
by action a at information state s. The weight
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a) η
pi(h) is analogous to the on-policy
distribution µ in the standard policy gradient theorem. Each component of the gradient treats the other
θs′,a′ as constant, increasing the local expected value contributed at s, which is just pi(s,a)·vη,pi(s,a),
can be optimized independently for the purposes of taking a single gradient step. The result is that
the problem can be decomposed into a per-state optimization problem, for the purposes of a single
policy gradient update. This is a direct consequence of the tabular representation and perfect recall.
We then observe that ACPI can implement some form of Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent
(GIGA) algorithm of Zinkevich [99], an application of greedy projection or now also called online
gradient descent [29]. The idea here is that there is an online convex program with a convex cost
function ck at each step k. The optimization proceeds by moving the point x (i.e. the policy) following
the gradient of ck at at step k and projecting back into the feasible set (of simplices) greedily after
each gradient step. GIGA is an application of online gradient descent to repeated games; Zinkevich
shows that GIGA minimizes regret against this adversary, defining a new OCP after each play.
In our case, we have local online convex programs OCP(s, k), one at each s, and a separate instantia-
tion of GIGA(s) at s that solves this local OCP at each s. Each problem is locally convex, and the
adversary is the policy pi−i for states outside of s. We use this as a basis to prove Theorem 1.
Our construction essentially shows that ACPI is equivalent to CFR except with the policy update rule
(RegretMatching on Algorithm 1, line 43) replaced by GIGA(s). We then show that PGPI can be
treated as a special case of this overall argument.
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Definition 2. State-local Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent (GIGA(s)) (an adaptation of
[99, Algorithm 2] proceeds as follows. Let θs = (θs,a′ for a′ ∈ A ) be the policy parameters at
s. Initialize θs arbitrarily according to simplex constraints. Choose a sequence of learning rates
{α1, α2, · · · , αK}, and repeat for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}:
1. Choose a according to pik(s)
2. Observe pi−i, and update the local policy pik(s):
(a) yk+1 = θs + αs,kvη,pi(s, ·)
(b) θs = P (yt+1),
where the projection P is defined as in Theorem 1.
Note that vη,pi(s) here is the gradient wrt θs,a of the score function from above. To prove Theorem 1,
we will make use of a few lemmas.
Lemma 1. The value of the local component ∂J
PG(piθ)
∂θs,a
= vη,pi(s, a) = η
pi
i (s)v
c
i (pi, s, a).
Proof.
vη,pi(s, a) =
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
ηpi(h)ηpi(ha, z)Gi,z as defined above
=
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
ηpii (h)η
pi
−i(h)η
pi(ha, z)Gi,z
= ηpii (s)
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
ηpi−i(h)η
pi(ha, z)Gi,z from perfect recall
= ηpii (s)v
c
i (pi, s, a)
The following lemma shows how the advantage is related to the local value GIGA(s) has in its update
rule:
Lemma 2. The advantage
qpi(s, a)−
∑
b
pi(s, b)qpi(s, b) =
vη,pi(s, a)
ηpii (s)B−i(pi, s)
− v
c
i (pi, s)
B−i(pi, s) .
Proof.
qpi(s, a)−
∑
b
pi(s, a)qpi(s, b) =
vci (pi, s, a)− vci (pi, s)
B−i(pi, s) from Section 3
=
vci (pi, s, a)
B−i(pi, s) −
vci (pi, s)
B−i(pi, s)
=
vη,pi(s, a)
ηpii (s)B−i(pi, s)
− v
c
i (pi, s)
B−i(pi, s) by Lemma 1
We require one more property about projections onto simplices:
Lemma 3. Define the simplex ∆ = {x ∈ <N : ∑i xi = 1}, and for some y ∈ <N the `2 projection
P (y) = argminx∈∆ ‖x− y‖2. If k is any real constant, then
P (y − k1) = P (y).
22
Proof.
P (y − k1) = argmin
x∈∆
‖x− (y − k1)‖2
= argmin
x∈∆
‖x+ k1− y‖2
= argmin
x∈∆
√√√√ N∑
i
(xi + k − yi)2
= argmin
x∈∆
√√√√ N∑
i
(x2i − 2xiyi + y2i + k2 + 2kxi − 2kyi)
= argmin
x∈∆
√√√√ N∑
i
((xi − yi)2 + k2 + 2kxi − 2kyi)
= argmin
x∈∆
√√√√ N∑
i
(xi − yi)2 +
N∑
i
k2 +
N∑
i
2kxi −
N∑
i
2kyi
= argmin
x∈∆
√√√√ N∑
i
(xi − yi)2 +Nk2 + 2k − 2k
N∑
i
yi since x ∈ ∆
= argmin
x∈∆
√√√√ N∑
i
(xi − yi)2.
The last line follows because
∑N
i yi is constant when minimizing over x, and the functions
√
f(x)
and
√
f(x) + c, for some constant c, are minimized at the same point.
We can now relate ACPI and GIGA(s) using the lemmas above.
Lemma 4. Running projected ACPI (or projected PGPI) with learning rates
αs,k = k
− 12B−i(pi, s)ηpii (s),
is equivalent to running GIGA(s) at each state s with its required learning rate of k−
1
2 ; as a result,
the total (local) regret at each state s after K steps is at most
√
K +
(√
K − 12
)
|A|(∆r)2, where
∆r = max ri −min ri.
Proof. We first prove the statement for ACPI. If we rewrite the ACPI update equations by substituting
the advantage from Lemma 2 and the learning rate in the statement of the theorem, after cancelling
terms we get:
θs,· ← P ({θs,a + k− 12 vη,pi(s, a)− k− 12 ηpii (s)vci (pi, s)}a)
Notice that the right-most term is a constant value added to all the components of the vector θs. These
constants shift each component of the vector θs by the same amount, which by Lemma 3 does not
affect the resulting local policy pik+1(s) when projected back onto the simplex, leaving an equivalent
update to the step 2(a) in Definition 2. The total regret is then obtained by [100, Theorem 4].
To prove the statement is true for PGPI, we simply need to retrace our steps. In Lemma 2, the
rightmost term is missing, leaving:
qpi(s, a) =
vη,pi(s, a)
ηpii (s)B−i(pi, s)
.
Now, when we rewrite the PGPI update equations, but substituting qpi(s, a) we obtain the same update
equation except missing the constant shift:
θs,· ← P ({θs,a + k− 12 vη,pi(s, a)}a).
and the same logic holds as before without the constant shift over all actions a at s.
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
E.1 Proof of Theorem 1
As a result of Lemma 4, the regret is minimized locally. Formally, for K steps the total local regret
for playing the sequence of policies pi0(s), pi1(s), · · · , piK(s) at s is:
Rki (s) = max
a∈A
K∑
k=1
vη,pi(s, a)− pik(s) · vη,pik(s,a) ≤
√
K + (
√
K − 1
2
)|A|(∆r)2
That is, the total regret over k steps is sublinear inK, so the average regret locally at each s approaches
0 as k →∞.
Using Lemma 1, and noticing that the second term is a dot product over a vector whose components
are vη,pik(s, a) for each a ∈ A at s, we can rewrite the above in terms of counterfactual values:
max
a∈A
K∑
k=1
ηpi
k
i (s)v
c
i (pi
k, s, a)− ηpiki (s)vci (pik, s) ≤
√
K + (
√
K − 1
2
)|A|(∆r)2,
Let ηmini = mink η
pik
i (s). We can divide both sides by this value to get an expression in terms of
counterfactual values only:
max
a∈A
K∑
k=1
vci (pi
k, s, a)− vci (pik, s) ≤
1
ηmini
(√
K + (
√
K − 1
2
)|A|(∆r)2
)
.
This means that average immediate counterfactual regret is also minimized at s, and similarly to [101,
Theorem 4] we can plug this into [101, Theorem 3] and get an upper bound on the overall average
regrets by summing over all states. Then by the Folk theorem ([101, Theorem 2]) this results in an
approximate Nash equilibrium with approximations that become more accurate as the number of
steps grows.
There are several observations worth noting from the regret bound above. The probability of reaching
a state (from one’s own policy), i.e. ηpii (s), plays a role in the bound. Specifically, a lower bound
on exploration might help ensure 1/ηmini is not too large. Also, the choice of η
min
i is conservative
and the upper-bound might be loose as a result; a more practical consideration might be to keep the
reach probability high to states where the average counterfactual regrets are high, and slowly lower
exploration to subtrees that consistently have low or zero regret (being sure to always sample with
positive probability in case a change in policy above triggers new changes further down the tree.)
Adding exploration in this way does not cause any problems for asymptotic convergence in the limit.
When using tabular policies in games with perfect recall, an exploratory behavior policy can be
decomposed into a mixture of main policy that is learning and some exploration policy due to Kuhn’s
theorem [44]. Then, the total regret can be decomposed into the regret from the policy that’s learning
and the regret of the exploration policy, and the latter is upper-bounded by the reward range (see [43]
for details). This introduces a source of constant regret and hence the exploration must be decayed
over time for it to vanish in the limit.
However, adding exploration in this way will affect the finite-time regret bound. The problem of 1
ηmini
can be overcome by using a stronger form of policy improvement, which we show in the next section.
E.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The original optimization problem concentrates on ascending the score function J(piθ) = vpi(s0).
The change in policy at every state is focused on increasing only the value of the initial state, which
leads to the changes at each state to be weighted by their reach probability. Hence this update is a
kind of incremental policy improvement with small/careful improvement steps, which is closer in
spirit to Conservative Policy Iteration [40] and Maximum aposteriori Policy Optimisation [2]. This is
in contrast to other tabular methods that perform a greedy policy improvement steps at every state.
Instead, strong ACPI changes the optimization problem to modify the policy in the direction of
ascent at all the state-local values simultaneously, which is closer in form to assigning (or moving
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toward) pi(s) = argmaxa q(s, a) at every state s as is done in value-based methods. This changes
the policy updates, so we now re-derive the gradient components from the start of this section, but
using state-local gradients at each state s.
Here, JPG(piθ, s) = Eρ∼pi[Gt | St = s]. The contribution of some θs,a to the gradient is:
∂JPG(piθ, s)
∂θs,a
=
∂
∂θs,a
 ∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
Pr(h | s)ηpi(h, z)ui(z)

=
∂
∂θs,a
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
ηpi−i(h)
B−i(pi, s)η
pi(h, z)ui(z) from Section 3.2
=
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
ηpi−i(h)
B−i(pi, s)η
pi(ha, z)ui(z).
which differs from vη,pi(s, a) by replacing the weight ηpi(h) by
ηpi−i(h)
B−i(pi,s) inside the sum.
It is now easy to verify that this value is more desirable than vη,pi(s, a) by looking again at Lemmas 1
and 2 using this new definition of value. Continuing from above,
∂JPG(piθ, s)
∂θs,a
= . . .
=
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
ηpi−i(h)
B−i(pi, s)η
pi(ha, z)ui(z)
=
1
B−i(pi, s)
∑
h,z∈Z(s,a)
ηpi−i(h)η
pi(ha, z)ui(z)
=
vci (pi, s, a)
B−i(pi, s) (which is an analog to Lemma 1)
=
vη,pi(s, a)
ηpii (s)B−i(pi, s)
=
∂
∂θs,a
JPG(piθ)
ηpii (s)B−i(pi, s)
,
where the last line shows how the learning rates relate between Theorems 1 and 2. The advantage
works out to be: qpi(s, a)−
∑
b pi(s, b)qpi(s, b)
=
vci (pi, s, a)− vci (pi, s)
B−i(pi, s) from Section 3
=
vci (pi, s, a)
B−i(pi, s) −
vci (pi, s)
B−i(pi, s)
=
∂
∂θs,a
JPG(piθ, s)−
∑
b
pi(s, b)
∂
∂θs,b
JPG(piθ, s) by the derivation above.
Now, when GIGA(s) uses this new value, we can state a lemma that analogous to Lemma 4 with but
with a weaker requirement on the learning rate:
Lemma 5. Running SACPI (or SPGPI) with learning rate αk = k−
1
2 is equivalent to running
GIGA(s) at each state s with its required learning rate of k−
1
2 ; as a result, the total (local) regret at
each state s after K steps is at most
√
K +
(√
K − 12
)
|A|(∆r)2, where ∆r = max ri −min ri.
The proof follows the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 4.
The proof of Theorem 2 then follows very closely the steps of proof of Theorem 1, but instead of the
counterfactual values being weighted by ηpi
k
i (s), they are instead weighted by
1
B−i(pi,s) . This is better
because then we can multiply both sides by B−i(pi, s) and remove it from the bound because it is
upper-bounded by 1. In particular, there is no occurence of 1
ηmini
.
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F On the similarity of QPG and RPG
As discussed in Section 3.2 and in [84, Chapter 13], subtracting the baseline does not affect the
gradient. Therefore, the QPG gradient at state s can be written as:
∇QPGθ (s) = ∇θ
(∑
a
piθ(s, a)q(s, a;w)
)
=
∑
a
∇θpiθ(s, a;θ)q(s, a;w).
The RPG gradient∇RPGθ (s) = −∇θ
∑
a (q(s, a;w)−
∑
b pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w))
+
=
∑
a
I
[
q(s, a;w) >
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
]
∇θ
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
=
∑
a
I
[
q(s, a;w) >
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
]∑
b
∇θpi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
=
∑
a
I
[
q(s, a;w) >
∑
b
pi(s, b;θ)q(s, b;w)
]
∇QPGθ (s)
= na+(s)∇QPGθ (s),
where the first line follows because ddx (x)
+ = 0 for x < 0, and na+(s) is the number of actions at
s with positive advantage. Therefore for any state s, the RPG gradient is proportional to the QPG
gradient.
In the special case of two-action games, at any state s, either the advantages are both 0 or there is one
negative-advantage action and one positive-advantage action, so∇RPGθ (s) = ∇QPGθ (s).
The similarity between RPG and QPG shown here could be (partly) responsible the similar behavior
of QPG and RPG that we observed in our experiments.
G Additional details on the experiments
For the policy gradient algorithm experiments, we tried both Adam and SGD optimizers and found
SGD to be better performing. We ran sweeps over learning rates and found 0.01 to be the best
performing one. The other hyper parameters in the search included Nq and batchsize and we found
that the values of 128 and 4 were the best performing in all the games. The entropy cost was swept
in the range [0, 0.2] and the best performing value was found to be 0.1 for all the domains. The
experiments were run over 5 different seeds and we noted that the exploitability across all 5 seeds
was very close (standard deviation = ±0.02).
The Nq and batch size hyper parameters correspond to the number of q-updates (critic) and batch
size used to compute actor and critic updates. Note that the critic (q) is updated more times (Nq) in
order to perform accurate policy evaluation before performing one policy improvement (actor update).
The hyper parameters were swept over a grid: {16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512} for Nq and {4, 8, 16, 32}
for batch size. The best performing values were Nq = 128 and batch size = 4. We performed the
experiments over 5 random seeds and found that the results for the chosen hyper parameters were
very close for all 5 seeds (standard deviation of 0.02). While we only performed a simple grid search,
we found that the chosen hyper parameters worked best across all games.
H Other Reductions to Counterfactual Regret Minimization
The reduction of ACPI to CFR shown in Section 3.2 is analogous to the reduction from another
existing algorithm, sequence-form replicator dynamics (SFRD) [25], to CFR [48].
In the common setting of estimating gradients from samples, the algorithm then becomes analogous
to the on-policy Monte Carlo sampling case in RL.
There is also a model-free sampled version of SFRD called sequence-form Q-learning (SFQ) [66]. In
SFQ, each step samples a deterministic policy requiring time linear in size of the policy. In contrast,
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actor-critic algorithms can work directly in the behavioral representation (tables indexed by s, a).
Also, RL-style function approximation can be easily used in the standard way to generalize over the
state space.
I Negative Results: Monte Carlo Regression CFR (Retracted Baseline)
In this section, we describe a baseline that we would have liked to include in the comparison: Monte
Carlo RCFR, a version of Regression CFR [92] built from sampled trajectories. Unfortunately, we
were unable to get stable results with this algorithm (with Monte Carlo sampling) and more work
needs to be done in order to investigate the cause of the instability.
CFR produces, at each iteration k, a joint policy pik, and cumulative regrets CREG(K, s, a) =∑
k∈{1,··· ,K REG(pik, s, a), and average cumulative regrets ACREG(K, s, a) =
1
K CREG(K, s, a).
CFR uses thresholded cumulative regrets TCREG(K, s, a) = CREG(K, s, a)+ (or
TACREG(K, s, a) = ACREG(K, s, a)+) values to determine the next policy pik+1 at each
information state using regret matching.
Regression CFR (RCFR) is a policy iteration algorithm that, like CFR, does full tree passes at each
iteration. However, it uses a regressor to approximate the CREG(K, s, a) for all information states.
The policies are still derived from these approximate regrets using regret matching. The original
RCFR used input features and regression trees. Our implementation uses raw input and neural
networks, with the same architectures as for our actor-critic experiments. We ran some experiments
for our implementation of RCFR, which are shown in Figure 10. We found SGD to be unstable for
this problem, and had better results using Adam [42].
Figure 10: Regression CFR convergence results; x-axis represents iterations k and y-axis represents
NASHCONV(pik). RCFR(inst, ?) refers to using instantaneous (immediate) regrets REG as the
regression targets, whereas RCFR(cumul) refers to the average cumulative regrets ACREG. Rotating
buffer refers to a circular buffer where new entries delete the oldest entries when the buffer is
full. Reservoir sampling seems to be important when using immediate regret as targets, since it is
predicting an average cumualtive regret. RCFR+ accumulates regret only if the immediate regrets are
positive.
RCFR is not a baseline in our experiments for the same reason CFR is not: it performs policy iteration
which requires free access to the environment, and a full state space sweep per iteration. So, we
define a sampling version, Monte Carlo RCFR (MCRCFR) that is entirely model-free (independent
of the environment and other players’ policies). MCRCFR differs from RCFR in the following ways:
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• A value critic is also trained from samples: vpi(s). This is done in exactly the same way as
in the actor-critic methods.
• A data set (of size 1 million) is retained to store data. Each data point stored in this data
set is a tuple (s,R, R̂EG(s, a), a)" the input encoding of the information state s, the return
obtained R, the sampled immediate regret R̂EG(s, a) = R − vpi, and the action that was
chosen a. Reservoir sampling [89] is used to replace data in this buffer, so in expectation
the data retained in the buffer is a uniform sample over all the data that was seen.
• Instead of running a full state space sweep, it samples a trajectory ρ using an explorative
policy µ = UNIFORM(A(s)) + (1 − )pii(s) at each s. At the beginning,  = 1 and is
decayed (multiplied) by 0.995 every 1000 episodes to a minimum of 0.0001.
• An average policy p¯ii is predicted via classification using the actions a that were taken at each
s stored in the data set, similar to NFSP. This is the policy we use to assess exploitability.
To train, we use Adam [42] a constant learning rate of 0.0001 and batch size of 128. For every 100
sampled episodes, for each network we assembled 10 mini-batches of 128 and run a training step.
MCRCFR seems similar to Advantage Regret Minimization (ARM) [38]. We outline the differences
below:
• ARM does not maintain a data set: it learns values and (thresholded) advantage values
online using moving average of the parameters (whose targets are composed of two separate
approximators), but does not predict the average policy.
• The q+k values are bootstrapped from previous values, which is possible when using CFR+.
(CFR average cumulative regrets cannot be bootstrapped in this way.)
• The q+k values predict cumulative sums rather than average cumulative values (see [38,
Equation 13]).
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